FDRLST Media, LLC v. NLRB
Do you believe free speech should be protected? We do! Lend your voice to NCLA’s fight against unlawful agency abuse of power.
By submitting this form you agree that you are over 18 years of age. You agree to receive occasional emails from NCLA about campaigns and other issues on NCLALegal.org. You can unsubscribe at any time.
CASE STATUS:
Closed
CASE START DATE:
June 7, 2019
DECIDING COURT:
National Labor Relations Board
ORIGINAL COURT:
National Labor Relations Board’s Administrative Law Judge
CASE SUMMARY
This was a case of whether a random person on Twitter could claim ‘unfair labor practice’ because a Tweet did not sit well with them. Individuals who are not directly impacted by the consequences of a comment on social media should not be allowed to co-opt the muscle of the federal Administrative State to bring frivolous charges, but that was exactly what happened here.
A tweet in jest by Ben Domenech, a co-founder and publisher of NCLA client FDRLST, Media, LLC, which publishes an online magazine, The Federalist, resulted in the filing of a formal charge with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The charging party, Joel F., a Tweeter who saw the post, retweeted it at the NLRB, and then he filed a complaint about the tweet with the NLRB, claiming that sending it constituted an “unfair” labor practice.
The tweet in question was posted on June 6th by Mr. Domenech who jokingly wrote from his personal account: “FYI @fdrlst first one of you tries to unionize I swear I’ll send you back to the salt mine.” The governing statute only allows an “aggrieved” person (such as an employee) to file a charge with the Board. However, the NLRB interpreted “aggrieved” to mean any person. This broad interpretation would have allowed anyone who deemed himself aggrieved—including a completely uninvolved person like Joel F.—to weaponize the NLRB’s investigatory processes against others with whom they disagreed. In Domenech’s case, the charging party was someone on Twitter, completely unrelated to The Federalist or its employees.
Armed with this misguided charge, NLRB subjected FDRLST to an onerous enforcement action that the agency lacked the jurisdiction to pursue. Congress has authorized the National Labor Relations Board to investigate unfair labor practices only when an aggrieved person files a charge with the Board. The NLRB interpreted “aggrieved” person to mean any person. This created the opportunity for anyone who deemed themselves aggrieved to weaponize the NLRB against political opponents.
NCLA represented FDRLST Media to insist that the NLRB limit its enforcement jurisdiction to the complaints of employees aggrieved by an allegedly unfair labor practice.
CASE DOCUMENTS
May 20, 2022 | Opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
July 27, 2021 | Filed 28(j) Letter: NLRB’s Decision in International Union of Operating Engineers, Local No. 150
July 7, 2021 | Petitioner/Cross-Respondent’s Reply Brief
June 7, 2021 | Brief for the National Labor Relations Board in U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
March 29, 2021 | Brief of Amicus Curiae on Behalf of the National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center in Support of Petitioner
March 29, 2021 | Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation in Support of Petitioner/Cross-Respondent and Reversal
March 29, 2021 | Brief of Amicus Curiae Institute for Free Speech in Support of Petitioner
March 29, 2021 | Brief of Amici Curiae FDRLST Media, LLC Employees Emily Jashinsky and Madeline Osburn and Southeastern Legal Foundation in Support of Petitioner/Crossrespondent and Reversal
March 29, 2021 | Brief of TechFreedom as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner and Reversal
March 29, 2021 | Brief of Amici Curiae the Cato Institute, Reason Foundation, Individual Rights Foundation, DKT Liberty Project, Nadine Strossen, P.J. O’Rourke, Clay Calvert, Robert Corn-Revere, Michael James Barton, and Penn & Tellerin Support of Petitioner/Cross-Respondent
March 22, 2021 | Petitioner/Cross-Respondent’s Opening Brief
December 9, 2020 | National Labor Relations Board’s Cross-Application for Enforcement of Its Order
December 1, 2020 | Petition for Review of the Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board
November 24, 2020 | Decision and Order by Chairman Ring and Members Kaplan and McFerran
August 17, 2020 | Brief to the National Labor Relations Board on Behalf of Amicus Curiae the Center on National Labor Policy, Inc.
July 24, 2020 | Motion and Amici Curiae Brief of FDRLST Employees Emily Jashinsky and Madeline Osburn in Support of FDRLST
July 20, 2020 | Respondent FDRLST Media, LLC’s Answering Brief to General Counsel’s Cross-Exceptions to the Decision of the Administrative Law Judge
July 20, 2020 | Respondent FDRLST Media, LLC’s Reply Brief in Support of Exceptions to the Administrative Law Judge’s Decision
June 19, 2020 | Brief in Support of Exceptions to the Administrative Law Judge’s Decision
June 19, 2020 | Exceptions to the Administrative Law Judge’s Decision
April 22, 2020 | Decision of the NLRB Administrative Law Judge, New York, NY
March 20, 2020 | Respondent’s Post-hearing Reply Brief
March 10, 2020 | Respondent’s Closing Post-hearing Brief
February 7, 2020 | NLRB Order to Deny Respondent's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint
January 24, 2020 | Reply Brief in Support of Respondent's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint
January 13, 2020 | Respondent's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint
PRESS RELEASE
May 20, 2022 | NCLA Clinches 1st Amend. Victory in NLRB Lawsuit over Ben Domenech Satirical Tweet, No Veiled Threat, Says Court
Washington, DC (May 20, 2022) – The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit sided with the New Civil Liberties Alliance today in its ruling to vacate the National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB) flawed decision to charge FDLRST Media, LLC with committing an “unfair labor practice.” The Court said, “[t]he record contains no sign—indeed, no inkling—of any circumstance at FDRLST Media that leads us to conclude that a reasonable employee would interpret Domenech’s tweet as a veiled threat.”
NCLA, a nonpartisan, nonprofit civil rights group, filed an appeal in FDRLST Media, LLC v. National Labor Relations Board in June 2020, challenging NLRB’s ruling that it was an unfair labor practice for petitioner Ben Domenech to have posted a satirical tweet from his personal account. NLRB’s order for Mr. Domenech to delete his personal tweet is unlawful because the tweet is (1) not an unfair labor practice, and (2) protected by the First Amendment.
The Court held that FDRLST did not violate the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Judge Thomas Hardiman wrote the majority opinion, concluding that NLRB’s “finding is not supported by substantial evidence,” and that the Board’s “failure to consider the tweet’s context dooms its finding of a veritable threat.”
The First Amendment protects Mr. Domenech’s satirical speech. As Judge Hardiman emphasized, “[T]o give effect to Congress’s intent and avoid conflict with the First Amendment, we must construe the Act narrowly when applied to pure speech, recognizing that only statements that constitute a true threat to an employee’s exercise of her labor rights are prohibited.” NLRB’s analysis of the context of Mr. Domenech’s tweet ultimately fell short. As the Court explained:
Employees’ subjective impressions are especially helpful where, as here, the employer claims his statement was made in jest. Humor is subjective. What is funny to a fisherman may be lost on a farmer. A quip about New England winters is unlikely to get a laugh in Alaska. The propensity for jokes to fall flat for want of context or audience understanding has given rise to idioms like “I guess you had to be there[.]” … Excluding context and viewing a statement in isolation, as the Board did here, could cause one to conclude that “break a leg” is always a threat. But when expressed to an actor, singer, dancer, or athlete, that phrase can reasonably be interpreted to mean only ‘good luck.’
NCLA released the following statements:
“NCLA is thrilled with this outcome. We knew all along that this tweet did not violate the National Labor Relations Act. Ben’s case highlights the problems with agency in-house adjudications because they require enforcement targets to run the gauntlet of a deeply biased process. It took getting this case before an Article III court, with independent judges, for free speech principles to prevail.”
— Kara Rollins, Litigation Counsel, NCLA
“My thanks to the Third Circuit for this decision, which honors and defends free speech and the right to tell a joke even if a humorless Twitter troll doesn’t get it. The decision and concurrence also raise key questions about the scope of the NLRA, questions I hope the courts will resolve, before other Americans in our social media age are subjected to taxpayer-funded ideological harassment for daring to laugh at people who don’t like to be mocked.”
— Ben Domenech, employee of FDRLST Media, Petitioner in FDRLST Media, LLC v. NLRB
“NCLA commends the Third Circuit for ruling that NLRB’s authority to supervise expression on social media violates the First Amendment when used to penalize a harmless joke. However, we continue to believe that the NLRA does not empower random people to activate NLRB’s enforcement machinery in the first place to punish speech they dislike. We also believe federal agencies like NLRB do not have the power to haul enforcement targets to foreign jurisdictions to adjudicate their alleged transgressions. NCLA will continue fighting to vindicate those principles in the future.”
— Mark Chenoweth, President and General Counsel, NCLA
For more information visit the case page here and watch the case video here.
ABOUT NCLA
NCLA is a nonpartisan, nonprofit civil rights group founded by prominent legal scholar Philip Hamburger to protect constitutional freedoms from violations by the Administrative State. NCLA’s public-interest litigation and other pro bono advocacy strive to tame the unlawful power of state and federal agencies and to foster a new civil liberties movement that will help restore Americans’ fundamental rights.
March 31, 2021 | NCLA Satirical Tweet Case Against NLRB Garners Strong Amicus Support over Free Speech Concerns
Washington, DC (March 31, 2020) – Liberty-minded organizations, distinguished civil liberties activists, including former ACLU president Nadine Strossen, and prominent entertainers, Penn and Teller, are among the amici curiae who have filed briefs in support of the arguments presented by the New Civil Liberties Alliance, a nonpartisan, nonprofit civil rights group in the satirical tweet case, FDRLST Media v. NLRB.
NCLA’s appellate brief asks the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to reverse the flawed ruling of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) from last November, which concluded that Mr. Domenech’s satirical tweet from his personal account constituted an unfair labor practice by his employer. FDRLST Media, publisher of the online magazine The Federalist, is fighting back because NLRB has neither subject-matter jurisdiction over this case nor personal jurisdiction over the company.
Eighteen amici curiae filed six amicus briefs in support of FDRLST Media and against NLRB’s deeply flawed power grab. Cato Institute, Reason Foundation, Individual Rights Foundation, DKT Liberty Project, Nadine Strossen, P.J. O’Rourke, Clay Calvert, Robert Corn-Revere, Michael James Barton, and entertainers Penn & Teller filed jointly; separate amicus briefs were presented by TechFreedom, Southeastern Legal Foundation and two of six FDRLST employees (Emily Jashinsky and Madeline Osburn), the Institute for Free Speech, Pacific Legal Foundation, and the National Federation of Independent Business.
Bridging the political divide, the amici curiae briefs contend that individuals have the right to speak freely and satirically to express their personal views under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
NCLA released the following statement:
“We are grateful that people from across the political spectrum, even those who would otherwise disagree on labor rights issues, have joined in support of FDRLST’s arguments and against NLRB’s. The Third Circuit should heed this clarion call.”
— Adi Dynar, NCLA Litigation Counsel
Excerpts from the six briefs amici curiae submitted in support of NCLA follow:
“[E]ven though Domenech’s tweet was a joke, this case is not. If you can be hauled into court and found in violation of federal law on the basis of satire, sarcasm, or hyperbole, everyone will self-censor their humor, to the detriment of freewheeling discourse. … When the NLRB can’t take a joke, the right to freewheeling speech both online and offline is threatened. The NLRB’s order should not be enforced.”
— Cato Institute, Reason Foundation, Individual Rights Foundation (IRF), DKT Liberty Project, Nadine Strossen, P.J. O’Rourke, Clay Calvert, Robert Corn-Revere, Michael James Barton, and Penn & Teller
“That we disagree with much of The Federalist’s speech … makes it all the more important that we defend the right to free speech in this case. There is no freedom for thought unless there is freedom for the thought that we hate. … What matters is that the petitioner has been unconstitutionally punished, its freedom of speech wrongfully curtailed.”
— TechFreedom
“On appeal, the employees submitted an amici curiae brief to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in support of their employer. The NLRB rejected their amici brief. The employees now come before this open and impartial Court seeking an opportunity to be heard. As members of the press, Amici have a strong interest in protecting First Amendment freedoms to discuss public affairs without fear of reprisal.”
— FDRLST Media, LLC Employees Emily Jashinsky and Madeline Osburn and Southeastern Legal Foundation (SLF)
“Limiting the definition of “aggrieved person” to those who are actually impacted by an alleged unfair labor practice still fulfills Congress’s intent in passing the NLRA of securing workers’ right to organize, while also avoiding infringement of First Amendment rights.”
— Institute for Free Speech (IFS)
“Should the NLRB seek Chevron deference for its regulation, this Court should not defer for four reasons. First, Chevron should not apply to the agency’s determination of when it has authority to institute proceedings against the regulated public. Second, at best Congress chose to remain silent, and an agency should not be entitled to expand its authority in the face of congressional silence. Third, the statute limits charging authority to “aggrieved” persons. Fourth, even if the statute is ambiguous, the regulation is not a reasonable interpretation.”
— Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF)
“By allowing someone with no specific injury or relationship to the charged party to file a charge, the Board weaponizes the NLRA against the business community. It flips the NLRA on its head, from being an administrative check on businesses, to being a tool ripe for abuse.”
— National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) Small Business Legal Center
For more information visit the case page here.
ABOUT NCLA
NCLA is a nonpartisan, nonprofit civil rights group founded by prominent legal scholar Philip Hamburger to protect constitutional freedoms from violations by the Administrative State. NCLA’s public-interest litigation and other pro bono advocacy strive to tame the unlawful power of state and federal agencies and to foster a new civil liberties movement that will help restore Americans’ fundamental rights.
March 22, 2021 | NCLA Asks Third Cir. to Reject NLRB’s Jurisdiction over Satirical Tweet Case
Washington, DC (March 22, 2021) – SWATting and Doxxing are noxious strategies that some immoral, left-of-center activists have employed to complicate and endanger the lives of their ideological adversaries. Perhaps unwittingly, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has read its governing statute so broadly that it is now permitting a similarly abusive strategy to take root. Rather than send a SWAT team to your house under false pretenses, NLRB has passed a rule that allows “any person” to file “unfair labor practice” charges against a company and thereby launch the agency’s formidable investigative and enforcement apparatus against that company. By contrast, the statute Congress passed limits the ability to file such unfair labor practice claims to “aggrieved” persons who have some kind of connection to the company or its employees.
The New Civil Liberties Alliance, a nonpartisan, nonprofit civil rights group, filed its opening brief today in FDRLST Media, LLC v. National Labor Relations Board. The brief asks the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to reverse the flawed ruling of the National Labor Relations Board from last November that it was an unfair labor practice for Mr. Domenech to have posted a satirical tweet from his personal account. Mr. Domenech’s employer, FDRLST Media, publisher of the online magazine The Federalist, is fighting back.
NCLA argues that NLRB has no statutory authority to prosecute this action because the governing statute only allows an “aggrieved” person (such as an employee) to file a charge with the Board. The National Labor Relations Act does not empower random, unaffiliated people on Twitter, like Mr. Joel Fleming, to weaponize NLRB to harass employers for their employees’ personal speech. NLRB ordered FDRLST to “direct Domenech to delete the statement from his personal Twitter account,” but it has no power to make FDRLST silence its employees. And without a valid Charging Party, NLRB has no subject-matter jurisdiction over this case.
Further, nothing in this case has any connection to New York, yet NLRB prosecuted FDRLST in its New York branch. NLRB has subjected FDRLST to an onerous enforcement action that the agency lacks the personal jurisdiction to pursue lawfully.
Finally, NCLA argues that the Court should not defer to the NLRB’s interpretation of the statutory person-aggrieved requirement under any judicial deference doctrines (like Chevron, City of Arlington, Auer, or Brand X), because such deference is unconstitutional. First, agency deference requires judges to abandon their duty of independent judgment, which is part of the judicial oath. Second, agency deference violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause by commanding judicial bias toward a litigant. If a court defers to the legal interpretation of one of the parties before the court—such as a federal agency—that denies a fair trial before a neutral tribunal to the other party before the court.
The Third Circuit should reverse NLRB’s decision and vacate its order because NLRB has neither subject-matter jurisdiction over this case nor personal jurisdiction over this defendant. In addition, it should set aside the NLRB regulation that allows “any person” to file an unfair labor practice charge. If the court decides that NLRB does have jurisdiction over this case, then it should still reverse the Board. Mr. Domenech’s tweet is (1) protected by the First Amendment and 29 U.S.C. § 158(c), which allow people to speak freely and satirically to the public at large, and (2) NLRB cannot constitutionally order FDRLST to demand Mr. Domenech delete the tweet from his personal account.
NCLA released the following statements:
“NLRB is attempting to muzzle precisely the type of speech it was created to protect. Its display of boorish tendencies before its own ALJs and board members should work only to its detriment in federal court.”
– Adi Dynar, NCLA Litigation Counsel
“The Constitution ensures that defendants cannot be dragged into court in jurisdictions with no connection to the parties or the alleged wrongdoing. That same rule applies when a federal agency is the prosecutor. There was simply no reason—let alone a constitutionally permissible one—for NLRB to bring this case in New York other than the Board’s brazen insistence that it’s above the law.”
– Jared McClain, NCLA Litigation Counsel
For more information visit the case page here.
ABOUT NCLA
NCLA is a nonpartisan, nonprofit civil rights group founded by prominent legal scholar Philip Hamburger to protect constitutional freedoms from violations by the Administrative State. NCLA’s public-interest litigation and other pro bono advocacy strive to tame the unlawful power of state and federal agencies and to foster a new civil liberties movement that will help restore Americans’ fundamental rights.
November 25, 2020 | NLRB Ruling in FDRLST Twitter Joke Case Lacks Common Sense and Sense of Humor, Says NCLA
Washington, DC (November 25, 2020) – The New Civil Liberties Alliance will challenge a ruling by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) that upheld the decision of Administrative Law Judge Kenneth W. Chu in the case of Joel Fleming v. FDRLST Media, LLC. NLRB has concluded that it was an unfair labor practice for Ben Domenech, publisher and co-founder of FDRLST Media, to have posted a satirical tweet from his personal account.
NCLA, a nonpartisan, nonprofit civil rights group, maintains the panel’s decision is flawed and that NLRB has subjected FDRLST to an onerous enforcement action where the agency lacks both subject-matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction under the Constitution and under NLRB’s own established practice. For starters, the National Labor Relations Act does not empower random people like Mr. Fleming, who was not “aggrieved” by the tweet and has no relationship to Mr. Domenech or FDRLST Media’s employees, to weaponize the NLRB’s investigatory processes against others with whom he disagrees and impose great costs on them. Further, FDRLST is not based in New York, and the alleged “unfair labor practice” did not occur in and was not directed at anyone residing in New York. Yet NLRB dragged the defendant into that jurisdiction.
The panel has ignored the fact that three employees of The Federalist submitted affidavits, testifying that the personal tweet in question by Mr. Domenech (who is not a party in this case) was, in fact, a joke, and that the employees took it as such, therefore, the tweet did not threaten FDRLST’s employees.
Additionally, the panel has ordered FDRLST to “direct Domenech to delete the statement from his personal Twitter account, and to take appropriate steps to ensure Domenech complies with the directive.” But FDRLST—as a media publication—does not regulate the personal speech of its employees, including that of Mr. Domenech, and there is no mechanism that would allow the company to demand he remove the tweet from his personal account.
NCLA will now appeal NLRB’s ruling to a federal appeals court.
NCLA released the following statements:
“Today’s decision shows that NLRB lacks both common sense and a sense of humor. It disregarded sworn employee statements saying that they perceived the tweet as just a joke. Apparently, NLRB thinks that to protect employees, the government must ignore them. We look forward to vindicating FDRLST Media in the U.S. Court of Appeals.”
– Adi Dynar, NCLA Litigation Counsel
“Despite the optimism we had, given that the law is on our client’s side, it comes as no real surprise that the NLRB refused to limit its own unconstitutional overreach. NCLA looks forward to raising our arguments before a federal court.”
—Jared McClain, NCLA Litigation Counsel
For more information visit the case page here.
ABOUT NCLA
NCLA is a nonpartisan, nonprofit civil rights group founded by prominent legal scholar Philip Hamburger to protect constitutional freedoms from violations by the Administrative State. NCLA’s public-interest litigation and other pro bono advocacy strive to tame the unlawful power of state and federal agencies and to foster a new civil liberties movement that will help restore Americans’ fundamental rights.
July 21, 2020 | NCLA Rejects NLRB General Counsel’s Approach to The Federalist’s Satirical Tweet Case
Washington, DC (July 21, 2020) – The New Civil Liberties Alliance, a nonpartisan, nonprofit civil rights group, has filed two different papers in the last 24 hours in Joel Fleming v. FDRLST Media, LLC. The papers include a response to the NLRB general counsel’s cross exceptions as well as a reply brief in support of the exceptions NCLA filed in response to the April 22nd decision issued by Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Kenneth W. Chu. NCLA is asking the full National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to reject the general counsel’s arguments because they have no basis in fact or law and because the Board lacks subject-matter jurisdiction in this case.
The general counsel is claiming that ALJ Chu abused his discretion when he admitted into evidence affidavits by three employees of The Federalist, an online magazine published by FDRLST, including one by Mr. Ben Domenech, the magazine’s co-founder and publisher. The affidavits, which testify that the personal tweet by Mr. Domenech (who is not party to this case) was, in fact, a joke, and that the employees took it as such, are relevant and admissible to show that the tweet did not threaten FDRLST’s employees.
NCLA believes ALJ Chu reached multiple flawed conclusions in his decision, none more so than those related to subject-matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction and venue. The National Labor Relations Act does not empower random people like Mr. Fleming, who was not “aggrieved” by the tweet, to sick NLRB on an employer with whom Mr. Fleming has no relationship. Further, the company is not based in New York, and the alleged unfair labor practice did not occur in and was not directed at anyone residing in New York. Yet NLRB dragged FDRLST into that jurisdiction anyway. Therefore, NLRB has subjected FDRLST to an onerous enforcement action where the agency lacks both subject-matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction under the Constitution and under NLRB’s own established practice.
Additionally, the general counsel is asking the court to order Mr. Domenech to delete the tweet in question. But the tweet was posted in Mr. Domenech’s personal Twitter account, not that of the FDRLST, and the general counsel’s demand would require that the FDRLST delete a tweet from an account that is not within its control. FDRLST—as a media publication—does not regulate the personal speech of its employees, including that of Mr. Domenech, and there is no mechanism that would allow the company to demand he remove the tweet from his personal account.
NCLA released the following statements:
“In the NLRB general counsel’s world of Alice in Wonderland, the prosecuting attorney’s evidence-less speculation is apparently more valid than actual evidence. And NLRB’s administrative law judges should supposedly order employers to order non-party employees to delete a tweet the employee published on the employee’s personal Twitter account. We are asking the Board not to go down that rabbit hole.”
— Adi Dynar, Litigation Counsel, NCLA
“Unsatiated by an initial ruling its favor, the general counsel is now back and asking for more-including remedies the Board is powerless to order and that infringe on the First Amendment rights an individual that is not party to the action. This must stop.”
— Kara Rollins, Litigation Counsel, NCLA
“Congress hasn’t authorized NLRB to bring an action like this, the Board’s own rules don’t allow it, and the Constitution forbids it. But at each turn, NLRB’s general counsel rejects any limits on the Board’s authority to prosecute viewpoints it dislikes, anywhere it likes. NCLA is simply asking the Board to follow the law where its ALJ and enforcement attorneys have thus far refused to do so.”
— Jared McClain, Staff Counsel, NCLA
ABOUT NCLA
NCLA is a nonpartisan, nonprofit civil rights group founded by prominent legal scholar Philip Hamburger to protect constitutional freedoms from violations by the Administrative State. NCLA’s public-interest litigation and other pro bono advocacy strive to tame the unlawful power of state and federal agencies and to foster a new civil liberties movement that will help restore Americans’ fundamental rights.
June 19, 2020 | NCLA Appeals Flawed ALJ Ruling on ‘Salt Mine’ Tweet to the National Labor Relations Board
Washington, DC (June 19, 2020) – The New Civil Liberties Alliance, a nonpartisan, nonprofit civil rights group, today filed exceptions and a supporting brief to the April 22nd decision issued by a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in Joel Fleming v. FDRLST Media, LLC.
NCLA takes exception to multiple erroneous conclusions reached by ALJ Kenneth W. Chu, but specifically, those related to subject-matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, venue, and what counts as an unfair labor practice.
On June 6, 2019, Mr. Ben Domenech, co-founder and publisher of The Federalist, an online magazine published by NCLA client FDRLST Media, jokingly commented on his personal Twitter account regarding a current event: “FYI@fdrlst first one of you tries to unionize I swear I’ll send you back to the salt mine.” Joel Fleming, a random Tweeter, filed a complaint with NLRB the next day claiming the post constituted an “unfair” labor practice.
NLRB then pursued the case without conducting a proper investigation. The general counsel and Joel Fleming failed to establish subject-matter jurisdiction. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) does not empower random people like Mr. Fleming, who was not “aggrieved” by an alleged unfair labor practice, to sick NLRB on an employer to whom he has no relationship.
The general counsel and Mr. Fleming also failed to establish personal jurisdiction over FDRLST. The company is not based in New York, and the alleged unfair labor practice did not occur in and was not directed at anyone residing in New York. Yet NLRB dragged the defendant into that jurisdiction anyway. Therefore, NLRB has subjected FDRLST to an onerous enforcement action where the agency lacks both subject-matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction under the Constitution and under NLRB’s own established practice regarding proper venue.
Even if NLRB had proper jurisdiction, NCLA also takes exception to the ALJ’s conclusion that FDRLST violated Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA with a tweet that “threatened” employees. NCLA maintains that ALJ Chu erred in his decision because the charging party and the Board’s prosecuting attorney failed to prove that FDRLST engaged in an unfair labor practice. The prosecuting attorney offered only his own speculations to prove his case against FDRLST. Such evidence fails to prove the case, and the First Amendment protects Mr. Domenech’s satirical speech.
NCLA requests that the Board schedule oral argument in this case.
NCLA released the following statement:
“This case was never lawfully opened in the first place. Mr. Fleming’s personal crusade against Mr. Domenech’s satirical Twitter commentary on a topic of public conversation has no business being a federal case. This egregious attempt to employ NLRB’s administrative apparatus to silence and punish FDRLST with administrative process and great costs on the basis of an ideological disagreement is entirely unlawful. The Board has a vital opportunity to get its house in order and send a message that it will not tolerate attempts by random people to harass third-party employers for their employees’ personal speech.”
— Adi Dynar, Litigation Counsel, NCLA
ABOUT NCLA
NCLA is a nonpartisan, nonprofit civil rights group founded by prominent legal scholar Philip Hamburger to protect constitutional freedoms from violations by the Administrative State. NCLA’s public-interest litigation and other pro bono advocacy strive to tame the unlawful power of state and federal agencies and to foster a new civil liberties movement that will help restore Americans’ fundamental rights.
April 23, 2020 | NCLA Will Appeal NLRB ALJ’s Decision in FDRLST Satirical Tweet Case
Washington, DC (April 23, 2020) – The New Civil Liberties Alliance, a nonpartisan, nonprofit civil rights organization will appeal Wednesday’s decision by a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to a full Board in the case of FDRLST Media LLC and Joel Fleming. ALJ [Chu] decided that NCLA client FDRLST Media, LLC, which publishes the online magazine The Federalist, engaged in an unfair labor practice when co-founder and publisher Ben Domenech made a satirical comment about a current news event on Twitter.
The tweet in jest was posted on June 6th by Mr. Domenech, who jokingly wrote from his private Twitter account: “FYI @fdrlst first one of you tries to unionize I swear I’ll send you back to the salt mine.” Joel Fleming, a random Tweeter, filed a complaint with NLRB claiming the post constituted an “unfair” labor practice.
In this case, the ALJ proceeded in deciding the question of whether the Tweet comprised an unfair labor practice and failed to respond in any detail to FDRLST’s forceful objections that NLRB lacked both subject-matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction to bring this case in New York.
Humor and satire are fully protected under the First Amendment and do not violate the National Labor Relations Act. NLRB has no authority to prosecute particular viewpoints and label them as violating the NLRA. A verbal joke can hardly be confused with a verbal threat. In fact, FDRLST employees attested to the fact in affidavits filed with the ALJ that they perceived the comment to be satirical in nature—a joke—and not a threat. But ALJ Chu did not get the joke.
The agency has erroneously interpreted the governing statute that only gives it jurisdiction when an “aggrieved” person (such as an employee) files a charge with the Board to mean any person. This mistake provides the opportunity for someone completely unrelated to The Federalist or its employees, like Joel Fleming, to activate the machinery of government and press unsubstantiated charges against others with whom they disagree politically.
Further, neither Ben Domenech nor The Federalist lives or works in the State of New York, yet NLRB dragged the defendant into that jurisdiction. NLRB has subjected Mr. Domenech and FDRLST to an onerous enforcement action that the agency lacks the subject-matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction to pursue lawfully.
NCLA released the following statement:
“An ALJ assigned to a case by the NLRB ruling in favor of the NLRB is the very definition of an administrative-adjudication system rigged against the non-government litigant. The process itself, as we have seen in this case, can be an oppressive punishment. Now, we wait for another wasteful round of litigation before the Board until we can obtain redress from a federal court.”
Adi Dynar, Litigation Counsel, NCLA
ABOUT NCLA
NCLA is a nonpartisan, nonprofit civil rights group founded by prominent legal scholar Philip Hamburger to protect constitutional freedoms from violations by the Administrative State. NCLA’s public-interest litigation and other pro bono advocacy strive to tame the unlawful power of state and federal agencies and to foster a new civil liberties movement that will help restore Americans’ fundamental rights.
For more information visit us online at NCLAlegal.org.
January 14, 2020 |NCLA Defends Founder of The Federalist from Outrageous NLRB Action
NCLA Defends Founder of The Federalist from Outrageous NLRB Action Instigated by Random Tweeter Who Is Not an “Aggrieved” Party Under Federal Labor Law
Joel F. v. FDRLST Media, LLC
Washington, DC (January 14, 2020) — A tweet in jest by Ben Domenech, a co-founder and publisher of NCLA client FDRLST Media, LLC, which publishes the online magazine, The Federalist, resulted in the filing of a formal charge with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The charging party, Joel F., a Tweeter who saw the post, retweeted it at the NLRB, and then he filed a complaint about the tweet with the NLRB, claiming that sending it constituted an “unfair” labor practice.
The tweet in question was posted on June 6th by Mr. Domenech who jokingly wrote from his private account: “FYI @fdrlst first one of you tries to unionize I swear I’ll send you back to the salt mine.” The governing statute only allows an “aggrieved” person (such as an employee) to file a charge with the Board. However, the NLRB has interpreted “aggrieved” to mean any person. This broad interpretation allows anyone who deems himself aggrieved—including a completely uninvolved person like Joel F.—to weaponize the NLRB’s investigatory processes against others with whom they disagree. In Domenech’s case, the charging party is someone on Twitter, completely unrelated to The Federalist or its employees.
Armed with this misguided complaint, NLRB is now subjecting FDRLST and Mr. Domenech to an onerous enforcement action that the agency lacks the jurisdiction to pursue. NCLA has filed a motion asking the NLRB administrative law judge to dismiss the case outright for lack of jurisdiction.
“A random person on Twitter cannot claim ‘unfair labor practice’ just because a joke didn’t sit well. Individuals who are not directly impacted by the consequences of a comment on social media should not be allowed to co-opt the muscle of the federal Administrative State to bring frivolous complaints, but that is exactly what happened here. We are hopeful that the ALJ will grant our motion to dismiss and limit the NLRB’s investigatory and prosecutorial jurisdiction to those actually ‘aggrieved.’”
—Adi Dynar, NCLA Litigation Counsel
“No employee objected to Ben’s joke, and no one actually in a position to perceive or complain about an unfair labor practice did so. Setting aside the fact that NLRB apparently lacks any sense of humor, this investigation is a colossal waste of taxpayer dollars. This case will at least establish that NLRB must tell troublemakers like Joel F. to MYOB.”
—Mark Chenoweth, NCLA Executive Director and General Counsel
Visit case summary page for more information: https://archive.nclalegal.org/joel-f-v-fdrlst-media-llc/
ABOUT NCLA
NCLA is a nonprofit civil rights organization founded by prominent legal scholar Philip Hamburger to protect constitutional freedoms from violations by the Administrative State. NCLA’s public-interest litigation and other pro bono advocacy strive to tame the unlawful power of state and federal agencies and to foster a new civil liberties movement that will help restore Americans’ fundamental rights. For more information visit us online: NCLAlegal.org.
BLOGS
November 13, 2020 | What Do Burger King, Ford Motor Co., and NLRB Have in Common?
Can a court force you to defend yourself against a lawsuit thousands of miles away in a place where something you made, created or said just happened to end up? The Supreme Court may answer this critical question in Ford Motor Co. v. Bandemer, consolidated with Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District.
In 2015, Adam Bandemer was injured after his car collided with a snowplow and claimed that his injuries occurred because his Ford airbag failed to deploy. Ford manufactured the car in Ontario, Canada, sold it in North Dakota, and, after 17 years and several transactions in the used-car market, the car ended up in Minnesota. Ford argues that, despite selling thousands of vehicles in Minnesota annually, it did not sell Bandemer’s car in the state and, as a result, should not be subject to the state’s jurisdiction. The Minnesota Supreme Court decided in favor of Bandemer on the theory that Ford had sold many cars in Minnesota and actively advertised those products in the state. In Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District, a case involving a similar set of facts as Bandemer, the Montana Supreme Court allowed a plaintiff to pursue a product liability suit against Ford even though Ford sold the car in question in Washington state. Because of the similarity of their facts and the legal questions involved, the Supreme Court has consolidated these two cases.
Courts can exercise either general or specific personal jurisdiction over defendants, but the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution restricts courts’ authority. Under Daimler AG v. Bauman, a court with general jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant can “hear any and all claims” only if the defendant’s connections with the court “are so constant and pervasive as to render it essentially at home.” A corporation is “at home” if its headquarters or place of incorporation is in a place where a court has jurisdiction.
However, because Ford is not “at home” in Minnesota or Montana, the plaintiffs in these cases have relied upon specific jurisdiction, which occurs when the defendant “purposefully avails” itself of doing business in the state, and the claims “arise out of or relate to” the defendant’s actions in the state—Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz. Ford admitted that it purposefully availed itself of doing business in Minnesota and Montana. Hence, the main issue is whether the claims “arise out of or relate to” Ford’s activities in those states.
In oral argument before the Supreme Court, Ford argued that there should be a “proximate-cause requirement” so that a state court can only exercise specific jurisdiction over the defendant if the plaintiff can demonstrate that the defendant’s activities in the forum state proximately caused plaintiff’s injury. In contrast, the plaintiffs argued for a much broader standard but conceded that Ford could avoid specific personal jurisdiction for vehicles sold out of state if it did not sell the same model in the state. If the Court accepts the plaintiff’s argument, it could lend credence to the “stream of commerce” theory whereby a defendant can purposefully avail itself of the forum state merely by selling products that end up there.
While corporations like Ford have the resources to face a more expansive reading of specific personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff’s proposed rule could have a devastating effect on small businesses and individuals. These smaller parties do not have the resources to defend themselves against suits in courts that may be hundreds, if not thousands, of miles away from where they live and work and whose actions only loosely “caused” the alleged injuries.
This issue of fundamental fairness is at the core of Joel Fleming v. FDRLST Media, LLC. In this case, Ben Domenech, the co-founder and publisher of the online magazine, the Federalist, posted a joking tweet stating “FYI @fdrlst first one of you tries to unionize I swear I’ll send you back to the salt mine.” Joel Fleming, a tweeter who saw the post, filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) arguing that Domenech’s tweet constituted an “unfair” labor practice because it allegedly discouraged potential unionization efforts by the magazine’s staff.
The NLRB has argued that it can pursue a burdensome enforcement action against The Federalist even though the agency’s enforcement statute only permits an “aggrieved” person to file a complaint, with the NLRB embracing the expansive standard that anyone can be “aggrieved.”
Curiously, NLRB Region 2, which has jurisdiction over the southern New York state, is presiding over the action. However, it is doubtful that Region 2 has general or specific personal jurisdiction over the LLC because it is not “at home” there, and none of the events leading to the suit arise out of or relate to any activities occurring within Region 2. The magazine’s headquarters is in Washington, D.C., and its place of incorporation is in Delaware. First, there is no allegation that the Federalist purposefully directed itself toward any residents of southern New York, and, second, Joel Fleming, the “aggrieved” person under the statute, lives outside of Region 2 and did not allege any harms that occurred within Region 2.
As the Supreme Court observed in Burger King, the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction must “comport with fair play and substantial justice.” Therefore, at the center of the legal debate in both Bandemer and FDRLST is whether it is fundamentally fair to subject defendants to legal proceedings hundreds or thousands of miles away in a place where something that you made, created or said just happened to end up. The answer to this question will exert a tremendous impact on the due process rights of all.
OPINION
April 28, 2020 | How My Joke on Twitter Became a Federal Case | The Wall Street Journal
April 25, 2022 | The NLRA Does Not Authorize Everyone on Twitter to Call the Labor Police | Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy
When Vox Media employees walked out during a bargaining dispute in 2019, Twitter users tweeted along.[2] Among the commentators was Ben Domenech, the publisher of the web magazine The Federalist. He tweeted from his personal account, “FYI @fdrlst first one of you tries to unionize I swear I’ll send you back to the salt mine.”[3] Again, Twitter users reacted. A senior contributor at The Federalist replied that workers “demand to be paid in Ben-mixed cocktails.”[4] Another Twitter user joked that readers should take The Federalist’s views “with literally an entire mine of salt.”[5] And others responded with some variation of, “Haha, it’s funny because it’s illegal.”[6] One Twitter user, though, made a federal case out of Domenech’s tweet.
Joel Fleming, a Boston attorney—and active Twitter user[7]—filed a charge with the National Labor Relations Board alleging that Domenech’s tweet was an unfair labor practice. Fleming’s charge was vital because NLRB does not have roving jurisdiction; it can investigate unfair labor practices only based on a filed charge.[8] The National Labor Relations Act provides, in passive voice, that the Board shall have power “[w]henever it is charged that any person has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice.”[9] The next sentence tolls the statute of limitations for unfair-labor-practice charges when “the person aggrieved thereby was prevented from filing such charge by reason of service in the armed forces[.]”[10] Whether a charging party must be aggrieved by the alleged practice became a threshold question in NLRB’s case against FDRLST Media, LLC, the company that publishes The Federalist.
The Board’s view is that anyone can file a charge, just like anyone can call the police. That reading of the NLRA caused a comedy of jurisdictional and constitutional errors. Fleming, it turned out, knew so little about FDRLST that he filed his charge in NLRB’s Region 2, which covers New York City, a forum with no connection to the case.[11] NLRB rules require a charging party to file a charge in the region where the unfair labor practice occurred.[12] These requirements are scarcely an issue since a charging party nearly always has a personal connection to the alleged conduct.[13] But Fleming’s lack of familiarity with FDRLST, and NRLB’s willingness to ignore its own rules, created the issue of whether due process limits the ability of a federal agency’s subdivision to assert personal jurisdiction over persons with no connection to that forum.
A stranger filing an unfair-labor-practice charge also created a third issue once the Board began to prosecute FDRLST. Because a charging party typically has some connection to an alleged unfair labor practice, important context is baked into the charge—context which is critical to the First Amendment restrictions on NLRB’s authority, including the existence of labor strife and how employees perceived the challenged speech. The First Amendment limits the Board’s enforcement power by requiring NLRB to assess employer speech “in the context of its labor relations setting.”[14] NLRB must investigate and prove how, given the surrounding circumstances, an objective employee at the charged company would feel threatened.[15] But the prosecution of FDRLST revealed how little NLRB believes that the First Amendment applies to its enforcement actions.
NLRB’s Case Against FDRLST
Empowered by Fleming’s charge, NLRB subpoenaed the testimony of four of FDRLST’s six employees and demanded that the company produce an enormous trove of internal documents relating to its editorial decisions.[16] After the company objected, the Board’s General Counsel stipulated to a sparse record that would constitute the agency’s entire case in chief.
FDRLST moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction, based on two principal arguments: (1) NLRB can prosecute unfair labor practices only when an aggrieved person has filed a charge and (2) NLRB Region 2 lacked personal jurisdiction over FDRLST because the company, the charging party, and the allegations lacked any relationship to New York. NLRB proceeded undeterred. Confining its legal analysis to a single paragraph, the Board ruled that “the clear and unambiguous weight of both Board and Supreme Court authority holds that any person may file an initial charge.”[17] And without further elaboration, the Board rejected the “attacks on personal jurisdiction” as “similarly inapposite.”[18]
NLRB’s General Counsel prosecuted the agency’s case before an NLRB employee, Administrative Law Judge Kenneth W. Chu. Despite having subpoenaed two-thirds of FDRLST’s employees, the NLRB General Counsel called no witnesses. Two FDRLST employees, however, submitted sworn affidavits through independent counsel explaining that they took Domenech’s tweet as a joke and did not feel threatened.[19] Domenech also submitted an affidavit explaining that his tweet was a joke. The agency’s only evidence was the tweet itself and those articles from The Federalist, which the General Counsel used to show an “anti-union editorial position.”[20] In ALJ Chu’s view, this evidence was enough to satisfy the agency’s burden of proving that Domenech’s tweet threatened or coerced FDRLST employees. The Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision, almost entirely.[21]
FDRLST petitioned for review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, asserting its two jurisdictional arguments and that NLRB’s enforcement violated the First Amendment because the agency failed to consider any contextual evidence.[22]
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
The primary issue on appeal is whether NLRB had subject-matter jurisdiction (i.e., statutory authorization) to prosecute FDRLST. As mentioned above, Congress used passive voice in the relevant statutory provision, empowering NLRB to investigate and prosecute “[w]henever it is charged that any person has engaged in … any such unfair labor practice[.]” But charged by whom?
FDRLST maintained that passive voice does not render a law’s subject unknowable or ambiguous. Relying on traditional tools of interpretation, courts will look to a statute’s structure, purpose, surrounding text and provisions to identify a particular actor. Chief Justice Marshall relied on the constitutional provisions surrounding the Fifth Amendment to determine that the actor prohibited from taking private property for public use was the federal government, not the states.[23] The same approach prevails today. Writing for a unanimous court in 2019, Justice Ginsburg discerned the subject of a passive-voice provision in the Copyright Act from surrounding sections and context.[24] And most pertinent to FDRLST’s case, the Burger Court held that surrounding context showed that Congress intended for “aggrieved persons” to be the subject of a passive-voice provision that authorized suit under § 810 of Title VIII.[25]
In line with this precedent, FDRLST cited several canons of statutory interpretation to support its conclusion that only “aggrieved persons” can file a charge. The phrasing “unless the person aggrieved thereby was prevented from filing such charge by reason of service in the armed forces” indicates that Congress expected that only aggrieved persons would file such unfair-labor-practice charges. In other words, aggrieved persons may file a charge, but the limitation period will toll for only those aggrieved persons prevented from filing by their services in the armed forces. If just anyone could file a charge, it would negate the charging limitation Congress placed on NLRB and give the agency roving investigative authority that the legislature withheld.
But NLRB reads the statute to permit anyone to file a charge and that the aggrievement requirement applies solely to the tolling provision. According to NLRB, Congress created two requirements for the tolling provision—a charging party must file within six months unless they (1) are aggrieved and (2) prevented from filing by service in the armed forces. NLRB says this reading reflects Congress’s desire to promote stability and finality in labor disputes through a very narrow statute of limitations. The problem, though, is that Congress did not write Section 10(b) as if it created two tolling requirements. On the contrary, the legislative history shows that Congress did not think it was changing anything at all about who could file a charge; the legislature, in the wake of World War II, was merely protecting the right of servicemembers to file a charge.[26]
Barely bothering with statutory interpretation, the Board relied almost exclusively on a throwaway line in a Supreme Court decision that predates the statute’s aggrievement language. In Indiana & Michigan, the issue was whether a union’s improper motives prevented it from being a charging party.[27] The Court ruled that a charging party’s motivation is irrelevant to the Board’s authority to investigate an unfair labor practice.[28] Notwithstanding the limited question at issue, the Court said in dicta that even a stranger to a labor contract could file a charge.[29] Elevating this dictum into binding regulation, the Board’s rules allow any person to file a charge—presumably even the NLRB General Counsel or any other Board employee.[30]
The problem for NLRB is that Section 10(b) would still limit who can file a charge even if it didn’t impose an aggrieved-person requirement. Originating in cases interpreting aggrieved-person provisions, the Supreme Court developed the “zone of interest” inquiry. The basic idea is that a statute applies to only the group of persons that Congress intended to protect. The Court has refined this inquiry over the years, articulating that a zone of interest does not extend as far as Article III standing.[31] And then, in Lexmark, the Court offered another important clarification: the zone-of-interest inquiry is a mode of statutory interpretation—not a standing analysis.[32] Lexmark held that, despite statutory language permitting “any person” to file a Lanham Act claim, the “zones-of-interests test” requires courts to presume “that a statutory cause of action extends only to plaintiffs whose interests ‘fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.”[33]
The Third Circuit will have to decide whether to interpret Section 10(b)’s charging requirement with traditional and modern tools of statutory interpretation or, instead, rely on a single sentence of dictum that predates the statute’s aggrievement language.
Personal Jurisdiction
NLRB’s decision to accept Joel Fleming’s charge, and prosecute its case, in Region 2 injected a novel issue of personal jurisdiction into the case. A region’s personal jurisdiction over a charged party is scarcely an issue because NLRB rules require a charging party to file a charge “with the Regional Director in which the alleged unfair labor practice has occurred or is occurring.”[34] But the Board’s willingness to flout its own rules to prosecute FDRLST created an extra constitutional issue.
NLRB has delegated its authority to regional directors across 32 regions with distinct geographic jurisdictions.[35] FDRLST challenged Region 2’s authority to hale the company into a tribunal without any connection to the case. The Board’s sole response was that it has nationwide jurisdiction and is not bound by Article III.
Personal jurisdiction, however, is a matter of individual liberty that derives from the Due Process Clause—not from Article III.[36] Over the centuries, the Supreme Court has adhered to a “general principle”[37] that a sovereign’s decision to divide its authority amongst districts “necessarily confines”[38] a local tribunal’s jurisdiction to its regional boundaries. As Justice Joseph Story explained, regional limitations on a tribunal’s exercise of personal are not an issue of sovereignty:
It matters not, whether it be a kingdom, a state, a county, or a city, or other local district. If it be the former, it is necessarily bounded and limited by the sovereignty of the government itself, which cannot be extraterritorial; if the latter, then the judicial interpretation is, that the sovereign has chosen to assign this special limit, short of his general authority.[39]
As administrative agencies proliferated, Justice Louis Brandeis reaffirmed the “default rule from common law,” from which courts should not “lightly assume[] that Congress chose to depart.”[40] In Robertson v. Railroad Labor Board, Justice Brandeis rejected the government’s attempt to ignore regional boundaries when issuing an administrative subpoena.[41] He said that this “general rule” was “in accordance with the practice at the common law,” and that courts should not “likely … assume[] that Congress intended to depart from a long-established policy.”[42]
Like NLRB, the Railroad Labor Board had nationwide jurisdiction and could “hold hearings at any place within the United States.”[43] But the Court saw “no reason … why Congress should have wished to compel every person summoned either to obey the Board’s administrative order without question, or to litigate his right to refuse to do so in such district, however remote from his home or temporary residence, as the Board might select.”[44] “It would be an extraordinary thing,” the Court concluded, “if, while guarding so carefully all departure from the general rule, Congress had conferred the exceptional power here invoked upon a board whose functions are purely advisory.”[45] More recently, the Court has again reiterated that “specific legislative authorization of extraterritorial service of summons was required for a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a person outside the district.”[46]
In FDRLST’s case, NLRB has failed to identify any specific legislative authorization for its regions to exercise personal jurisdiction beyond their boundaries.[47] That the Board “chose[] to assign” a “special limit, short of [its] general authority,” and that the Board’s own rules didn’t even allow the case to proceed in Region 2, severely undermines that region’s exercise of jurisdiction over FDRLST. The case is all set up for the Third Circuit to be the first court to address the due-process limitations on a federal agency’s extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction.
First Amendment
Over 50 years ago, the Supreme Court considered how the First Amendment restricts NLRB’s ability to prosecute employer speech. Gissel Packing explained that the NLRA “merely implements the First Amendment by requiring that the expression of ‘any views, argument, or opinion’ shall not be ‘evidence of an unfair labor practice,’ so long as such expression contains ‘no threat of reprisal or force or promise of a benefit[.]’”[48] To avoid infringing the First Amendment, NLRB must consider the context of the particular labor relationship.[49] The Court also emphasized that NLRB’s policies at the time imposed a “duty to focus on the question: ‘What did the speaker intend and the listener understand?’”[50] Many courts of appeals, however, have ignored that last portion about employer intent, and upheld NLRB’s whittling away of Gissel Packing.[51] Because the test is whether an objective employee would feel threatened, those courts have held that an employer’s subjective intent is irrelevant.[52] But even those courts still require NLRB to consider contextual evidence.[53]
FDRLST’s Third Circuit case asks just how much context NLRB must consider to avoid violating the First Amendment. As mentioned, the General Counsel withdrew its subpoenas of FDRLST employees and put forward no evidence other than Domenech’s tweet and some articles to show that The Federalist has an anti-union viewpoint. On appeal, the Board declined to consider the articles (as well as the employee affidavits saying the tweet was an obvious joke), leaving Domenech’s tweet as the only evidence.
In FDRLST’s view, the Board’s refusal to consider any context of the employment relationship at issue, or how a FDRLST employee would have perceived the tweet, violated the First Amendment standard established in Gissel Packing. Relying only on a dictionary of idioms, the Board insisted that Domenech’s joke about sending employees “back to the salt mine” cannot possibly be read as anything other than a threat.[54]
At oral argument before the Third Circuit, Judge Thomas Hardiman pressed the Board on whether it has ever before found an employer’s speech threatening based on so little contextual evidence: “where is the evidence in this record that the ALJ or the Board considered the context in which this tweet was issued? All the facts and circumstances surrounding the tweet including when it was made, how many people worked at the company, all that sort of thing. It seems like a pretty thin record as to whether … the tweet was contextualized. … I’m asking, where? Please point to the ALJ’s opinion, the Board’s opinion, to give us some confidence that this tweet was contextualized and not viewed in a vacuum.”[55] Judge Hardiman also expressed concern that employer speech on social media presented new challenges and questioned whether this case would just be “a one off.”[56] But this case is not a one off. In fact, this isn’t even the only charge Joel Fleming has filed—he charged another conservative publication as well.[57]
For his part, Judge Paul Matey identified the link between NLRB allowing a stranger to file a charge and the lack of contextual evidence. Judge Matey saw how these two points would combine to broaden NLRB’s powers in future investigations based on “a very creative and novel interpretation” of the Board’s power—“[o]ne that extends to expressions that are clearly understood by reasonable speakers of English as humor, because they might have the potential to influence those employee relationships that as we said were not really employer relationships ‘cause they were brought by [a] third party.”[58]
It seemed from oral argument that the panel appreciated that NLRB’s prosecution of FDRLST—based solely on a stranger’s charge and the face of a tweet—was an expansion of the agency’s enforcement authority. With so many dispositive issues at play, though, it’s anyone’s guess how the panel might decide the case.
[1]* The authors represent FDRLST Media, LLC, in its case against NLRB. They would like to specially acknowledge Aditya Dynar for his work on this case during his time at the New Civil Liberties Alliance.
[2] Twitter Event, Vox Media employees stage walkout during contract efforts, Twitter (June 6, 2019), https://bit.ly/3IBB5xq.
[3] Ben Domenech (@bdomenech), Twitter (June 6, 2019, 11:39 PM), https://bit.ly/3yIKRcx.
[4] Inez Feltscher Stepman (@InezFeltscher), Twitter (June 7, 2019, 9:30 AM), https://bit.ly/3J47xsh; Inez Feltscher Stepman, The Federalist, https://bit.ly/3J3VqLZ (last visited Dec. 17, 2021).
[5] Judy Berman (@judyberman), Twitter (June 7, 2019, 1:50 PM), https://bit.ly/33N13xW.
[6] Samer (@Samer), Twitter (June 7, 2019, 12:13 PM), https://bit.ly/32f1KPZ.
[7] At the time of publication, Joel Fleming’s Twitter bio was, “A Bernie-supporting class action lawyer in Massachusetts with no ties to The Federalist or anyone who works there.” Joel Fleming (@jfleming2870), Twitter, https://bit.ly/3pbX2LM (last visited Dec. 17, 2021). Fleming has made a thing of filing charges against Bens who have different views than him. In 2020, he accused Ben Shapiro of violating the NLRA, before ultimately withdrawing the charge. Jerry Lambe, Federal Labor Agency Dismisses ‘Frivolous Charges’ Against Ben Shapiro and The Daily Wire, Law & Crime Blog (May 17, 2021, 5:34 PM), https://bit.ly/3E930kI.
[8] 29 U.S.C. § 160(a).
[9] Id.
[10] Id.
[11] Fleming also attempted to serve FDRLST at some address in Chicago, another location with no connection to the company.
[12] 29 C.F.R. § 102.10.
[13] As a former NLRB general counsel has said, the notion that somebody on the street could just file a charge was “a joke at the board … but that rarely if ever happens” and “99.9999%” of the charges filed were by people connected to the labor relationship. Braden Campbell, Federalist Faces Tall Task in Fighting NLRB’s Tweet Ruling, Law360 Emp’t Auth. (Nov. 9, 2021, 11:15AM), https://bit.ly/3pfo30K.
[14] NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969).
[15] NLRB’s current test ignores the type of company and the business it produces. By doings so, the Board’s “objective” test disfavors companies that publish content or advocate for policies that are critical of unions and, consequently, attract employees of like mind. In other words, the Board creates a fiction in which the objective FDRLST employee and the objective Vox Media employee engaged in labor negotiations would perceive an anti-union joke the same way.
[16] The First Amendment protects editorial rights, making the Board’s initial discovery demands particularly egregious. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
[17] FDRLST Media, LLC and Joel Fleming, Case 02-CA-243109, Order at 1 (Feb. 7, 2020) available at https://bit.ly/3yOxvv9.
[18] Id. at 2.
[19] See FDRLST Media, LLC and Joel Fleming, Case 02-CA-243109, Affidavit of Madeline Osbourne (Feb. 7, 2020); FDRLST Media, LLC and Joel Fleming, Case 02-CA-243109, Affidavit of Emily Jashinsky (Feb. 8, 2020). These same employees also attempted to file an amici curiae brief before the Board, but NLRB rejected their brief. The Third Circuit, however, permitted them to participate as amici curiae on appeal.
[20] FDRLST Media, LLC and Joel Fleming, Case 02-CA-243109, Decision at ¶ 25 (Apr. 22, 2020) available at https://bit.ly/3GXlbf5.
[21] FDRLST Media, LLC and Joel Fleming, 370 NLRB No. 49 (Nov. 24, 2020). The only exceptions the Board took with ALJ Chu’s decision were that he was too easy on FDRLST: he shouldn’t have let FDRLST employees submit affidavits, and he should have made FDRLST order Domenech to delete his tweet. Id.
[22] The company also challenged the Board’s remedy of requiring FDRLST to require Domenech to delete his tweet and argued that the Court owed no deference to NLRB.
[23] Barron v. City of Balt., 32 U.S. 243, 248 (1833).
[24] Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881, 888-89 (2019).
[25] Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 101-05 (1979).
[26] 93 Cong. Rec. 6494, 6505 (1947).
[27] Nat’l Labor Relations Board v. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co., 318 U.S. 9 (1943).
[28] Id. at 18.
[29] Id. at 17-18.
[30] 29 C.F.R. § 102.9.
[31] See, e.g., Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 177 (2011).
[32] Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Ctrl. Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 127 (2014).
[33] Id. at 129-30.
[34] 29 C.F.R. § 102.10.
[35] See 29 U.S.C. § 154(a) (authorizing the Board to delegate its authority to regional directors); 29 C.F.R. § 102.1(d) (“Region means that part of the United States or any territory thereof fixed by the Board as a particular region.”); see also 1 NLRB Ann. Rep. at 4, 16 (1936) (“The [pre-NLRA] Board … established 20 regional boards … to adjust cases and hold hearings in the regions where the controversies arose, and thus expedite the cases and enable the parties to avoid the burden of coming to Washington.”).
[36] Ins. Corp. of Ire. v. Compagnie de Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) (“The requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction flows not from Art. III, but from the Due Process Clause. … It represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty but as a matter of individual liberty.”). Because personal jurisdiction is a due-process requirement, it matters not whether the tribunal is part of a state or the federal government. See also Mussat v. IQVIA, Inc., 953 F.3d 441, 446 (7th Cir. 2020) (“[I]n federal court it is the First Amendment’s Due Process Clause that is applicable, but the mention of the Fourteenth Amendment ma[kes] no different here.”); cf. Robertson v. R.R. Labor Bd., 268 U.S. at 623 (“No distinction has been drawn between the case where the plaintiff is the Government and where he is a private citizen.”).
[37] Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609, 611 (C.C. D. Mass 1828) (Story, J.).
[38] Ex parte Graham, 10 F. Cas. 911, 912 (C.C. E.D. Pa. 1818) (Washington, J.).
[39] Picquet, 19 F. Ca. at 611.
[40] Robertson v. R.R. Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 626 (1925).
[41] Id.
[42] Id.
[43] Id.
[44] Id.
[45] Id. at 627.
[46] Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., Ltd., 484 U.S. 97, 109 (1987).
[47] Section 10(e) limits the Board’s authority to petition for judicial enforcement to “within any circuit or district [court,] respectively, wherein the unfair labor practice in question occurred or wherein such person resides or transactions business[.]” 29 U.S.C. § 160(e); see also id. § 161(2) (limiting the Board’s enforcement of subpoenas to federal courts “within the jurisdiction of which the inquiry is carried on or within the jurisdiction of which said person … is found or resides or transacts business”).
[48] NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969).
[49] Id.
[50] Id. at 619.
[51] See, e.g., Stein Seal Co. v. NLRB, 605 F.2d 703, 706 (3d Cir. 1979) (“The relevant inquiry is not Dr. Stein’s intent[.]”).
[52] See id.
[53] See, e.g., Hedstrom Co. v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 305, 314-15 (3d Cir. 1980) (“This exchange occurred during a discussion of the employee’s union activities. Moreover, it took place in a context that included previous coercive interrogatories of employees regarding union activities and previous solicitations by company officials for the purpose of inducing employees to abandon such activities.”); NLRB v. Garry Mfg. Co., 630 F.2d 934, 945 (3d Cir. 1980) (considering an employer’s statements “[i]n the context of the election campaign”).
[54] FDRLST Media, LLC and Joel Fleming, 370 NLRB No. 49, n.4 (Nov. 24, 2020).
[55] Oral Argument at 23:05 – 24:16, FDRLST Media v. NLRB, No. 20-3434 (3d Cir., argued Nov. 10, 2021), available at https://bit.ly/331HIIV.
[56] Id. at 32:40 – 33:04.
[57] See Lambe supra note 6.
[58] Oral Argument supra note 54 at 28:50 – 30:25.
Originally published in the Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy on January 8, 2022
Written by Jared McClain & Kara Rollins.
April 26, 2022 | The Federal Government Forces Social Media Companies to Censor Americans | Brownstone Institute
In May of 2021, the Biden Administration began a public, coordinated campaign to combat the dissemination of “health misinformation” related to Covid, especially across social media platforms.
Members of the Administration, including Surgeon General Vivek Murthy and the President himself, often through White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki, have made clear that they blame Big Tech for American deaths from the virus, and insist that these platforms have an obligation to censor those who articulate views that depart from the Government’s messaging on Covid-related matters.
The Administration has stated that it supports “a robust anti-trust program,” a not-so-subtle warning that if the Twitters and Facebooks of the world do not do the Government’s bidding, they will suffer the consequences.
The campaign has been increasing in intensity for nearly a year. Ms. Psaki and Dr. Murthy have subsequently stated that the government is flagging problematic posts for social media platforms to censor and commanded them to elevate the voices of those who promote the approved messaging through algorithms while banning those whose perspectives conflict with the government.
The President has affirmed his belief that social media platforms “should be held accountable” for misinformation circulated on them. On March 3, Dr. Murthy announced an initiative, wherein he demanded that tech companies provide the government with “sources of misinformation,” including the identity of specific individuals, by May 2.
Like many others around the world, Michael P. Senger of California, Mark Changizi of Ohio, and Daniel Kotzin of Colorado, operated Twitter accounts that centered around criticizing government and public health Covid restrictions. All three accounts rapidly became popular.
Starting last spring, right around the time the Biden Administration’s efforts became public, the three were subject to temporary suspensions. Mere days after Dr. Murthy’s March 3 statement, Mr. Kotzin was suspended for a week, and Mr. Senger permanently. This means he is never permitted to create another Twitter account. He has lost his 112,000 followers, and in his own words, been “silenced and completely cut off from” the network he developed over two years.
According to Twitter, the suspensions were for spreading Covid “misinformation.” Mr. Senger, Mr. Changizi, and Mr. Kotzin had, in the cited tweets, expressed opposition to vaccine mandates and suggested that the vaccines do not slow the spread of Covid. They also argued that government-imposed restrictions do not work to mitigate viral spread, the risks Covid poses to children are sufficiently low to disfavor vaccination for them given the long-term unknowns, and naturally acquired immunity is superior to that attained through vaccination.
None of these claims is outside the realm of legitimate scientific discourse. In fact, figures like CDC Director Rochelle Walensky, Anthony Fauci, and President Biden, who a mere six or eight months ago expressed absolute confidence that, for example, the vaccines stop transmission and confer better protection than naturally acquired immunity, have now been confronted with unequivocal evidence that they were wrong.
A meta-study out of Johns Hopkins University concluded that lockdowns did not reduce Covid deaths, while causing quite a bit of harm, corroborating observational data from around the world. Several Scandinavian countries recommend against vaccinating healthy young children based on an objective risk assessment, and study after study has proven that naturally acquired immunity is superior to vaccine-induced immunity.
Following nearly two years of insistence that community masking is effective, many prominent public health officials have changed course. It is a great irony that those who have been so wrong throughout the pandemic now seek to silence dissenters, particularly those who have proven prescient on many topics.
And even if they were expressing flatly incorrect views, the First Amendment gives them the right to voice those opinions. The concept of free speech was embraced by the Framers of the Constitution, who were clearly wiser than many who govern us today. They recognized that censorship does not work practically: rather, it encourages people to operate covertly, often exacerbating the problem, and that the cure to bad speech is good speech. But most of all, they understood that giving government the authority to determine which ideas should be heard and which should be suppressed is a dangerous game.
Of course, many will argue that Twitter and other tech companies censored Mr. Senger, Mr. Changizi, and Mr. Kotzin of their own volition, and as they are private actors, the First Amendment is inapplicable.
That argument should be rejected. When the government commandeers, coerces, or utilizes private companies to accomplish what it cannot do directly, courts recognize that is state action. In a mid-20thcentury version of this case, Bantam Books v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court held that a state government commission consigned with reprimanding sellers of pornography and advising them of their legal rights (a veiled threat) “deliberately set about to achieve the suppression of publications deemed ‘objectionable’ and succeeded in its aim.” The Court looked “through forms to the substance” and concluded that this program violated the First Amendment.
That is similar to what is happening here. The Biden Administration knows that it cannot get away with issuing orders directly prohibiting people from articulating views about Covid-related matters that differ from the government’s, or from obtaining users’ private information, so it is coercing companies into doing this on the government’s behalf.
Fearing reprisal from the government—reprisal that the government has publicly contemplated—the companies are ramping up censorship. These companies are also likely to turn over information about users that Dr. Murthy demanded, a violation of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against warrantless searches.
Not only are individuals like Mr. Senger being silenced outright. Mr. Changizi, Mr. Kotzin, and millions of others are afraid to say what they really think because they do not want to suffer Mr. Senger’s fate. Courts should “look through forms to the substance” and recognize what is going on.
The Government is deciding what speech is acceptable and may be heard, and what speech is not acceptable and must be silenced, on the most hotly debated political topics of our time. This strikes at the heart of what the First Amendment is supposed to protect.
Originally published in Brownstone Institute on April 21, 2022
Jenin Younes is Litigation Counsel at the New Civil Liberties Alliance and represents Michael P. Senger, Mark Changizi, and Daniel Kotzin in their lawsuit against the Government.